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REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: IS
UNOCAL THE ANSWER?
"International law is the normative expression of the inter-
national political system"' and as a result, international law
governs the relations between states.' Within this international
system, however, states are free to regulate their nationals, as well
as the relations between their nationals and other states.3 A
rational corollary to this is the right of a state to regulate a
multinational corporation (MNC) incorporated within its territory.4
The steady growth in the overseas operations of MNCs, through
their foreign subsidiaries, collaborations with alien corporations,
and joint ventures, has complicated this traditional view of
jurisdiction.5
The issue ofjurisdiction over MNCs is further complicated by the
fact that international law fails to provide a framework within
1. LouIs HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POUirCS AND VALUEs 4 (1995). The political
entities that comprise the international political system are states, not individual human
beings. See id. at 5.
2. See Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 4 (Sept. 7); see also H.
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUmAN RIGHTS 6-7 (1968) (stating that the notion
that states alone are the subject of international law was afimnly entrenched doctrine by the
nineteenth century); Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of
Individuals, 50 AM. J. INTlL L. 533, 535, 541 (1956) (same).
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(2) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; see also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 18
("International law has accepted the authority of a state to represent its citizens-nationals,
as well as its authority to regulate their activities abroad.").
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 402 cmt. e (stating that the nationality of
a corporation is that of the state under whose laws it is organized); HENKIN, supra note 1,
at 18, 236.
5. In recent years, there has been "some controversy over the uses of the concept of
nationality to support jurisdiction over inter-corporate affiliates (the parent company,
subsidiaries, branches) of an integrated multinational company, or over joint ventures
of a national with one who is not a national." HENmN, supra note 1, at 232; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 414 cmt. a (reflecting the "recognition that
multinational enterprises do not fit neatly into the traditional bases of jurisdiction...
[because] such enterprises may not be nationals of one state only and their activities are not
limited to one state's territory").
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which a corporate actor may act responsibly.6 Without an estab-
lished framework, the courts are unclear as to the level of
involvement and type of conduct that constitutes a violation of
international law. Given the increasing importance of MNCs in the
global market, these issues deserve better treatment than the
current judicial stance provides.
Over the last two decades, the attention of international law has
shifted from violations committed by governments to violations
committed by private actors, especially MNCs.7 Corporate human
rights violations have become the focus of social and judicial
disapproval. U.S. courts have witnessed an increase in human
rights suits brought by aliens against MNCs.9 In one such case,
National Coalition Government of Burma v. Unocal Inc.,'" a United
States district court held that a corporation could be held liable for
its overseas violations of international human rights." This decision
reflects the growing trend in federal courts of holding private
individuals accountable under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)'
for violations of international human rights law.'" Several courts
6. See infra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
7. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge
of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 221 (1991); cf Douglass Cassel, Corporate
Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963, 1979 (1996)
("As the real power of multinationals has grown, the real power of national governments has
shrunk.").
8. See Cassel, supra note 7, at 1963.
9. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999); National
Coalition Gov't of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997); see also Michael Dobbs, Lawyers Target
Japanese Abuses; WWII Compensation Effort Shifts from Europe to Asia, WASH. POST, Mar.
5, 2000, at Al (describing a class action lawsuit filed in December 1999 against three
Japanese corporations by former prisoners of war who were used as slave laborers in Japan
during World War H); Brian Johns, Chevron Sued OverNigerian Violence, THEPROGRESS WE,
Nov. 1999, at 11 (discussing a class action lawsuit filed on the behalf of victims of Chevron's
human rights abuses in Nigeria).
10. 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
11. See id. at 348.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
13. Recently, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,445 (D.N.J. 1999), adopted
the Unocal rationale in a case involving a Belgian plaintiffwho alleged that Ford Motor Co.
and its German subsidiary, Ford Werke A.G., violated the law of nations under the ATCA.
See id. The plaintiff and others had been forced to work in Ford's German factories under
inhuman conditions and without compensation during World War II. See id. The court
asserted that "no logical reason exists for allowing private individuals and corporations to
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had already rejected the traditional view that only states could
violate international law and held that individuals acting under
"color of law" could also be liable. 4 Unocal, however, went a step
further and implied that a corporation's purely private actions could
also be sanctioned under international law. 5 Unocal and
subsequent cases incorporating the Unocal approach are of concern
because the standard set by these courts is unclear-there is no
bright line rule regarding the type of conduct and the level of
involvement necessary for a corporation to be held accountable for
its human rights violations overseas.'"
This potential expansion of accountability, although laudable,
raises a disturbing question: what are the implications of the
Unocal decision for corporations, including alien corporate entities,
if their questionable business practices are subject to sanctions
under international law?
This Note analyzes Unocal's impact on corporations against the
backdrop of customary international law as applied in U.S. courts
through the ATCA. Part I discusses the concept of "law of nations,"
or customary international law and the place of human rights in
this legal scheme. Part II examines the ATCA, specifically its use
in international human rights suits in U.S. courts and the courts'
interpretation of the ATCA. Part II analyzes Unocal's impact on
U.S. and foreign corporations and proposes that a mandatory code
of corporate conduct might ensure that the judiciary does not
overreach its authority in crafting its definition of international
law. Although there are other significant jurisdictional restraints
on the power of federal forums to sanction foreign corporate
activity, this does not give federal courts the authority to disregard
the scope of international law.
This Note concludes that federal courts should be wary of
sanctioning the conduct of corporations under the murky standard
escape liability for universally condemned violations of international law merely because
they were not acting under color of law." Id.
14. State action was initially deemed necessary before liability could attach under
international law. For a discussion of the origin of this requirement and its role in
international human rights litigation in U.S. courts, see infra notes 66-84 and accompanying
text.
15. See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 348.
16. See infra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
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of international law. As a solution, this Note proposes the adoption
of a mandatory code of corporate conduct similar to the corporate
codes of conduct proposed by the United Nations, which were never
formally adopted.' 7
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw-THE LAW OF NATIONS
Origin of Customary International Law
The earliest definition of the law of nations"8 is found in
Blackstone's Commentaries. According to Blackstone, the law of
nations signifies "a system of rules, deducible by natural reason,
and established by universal consent .among the civilized
inhabitants of the world." 9 The law of nations referred to the body
of rules binding upon civilized states in their relations with each
other.2" Classical international law was predominantly statist:2 ' a
law was binding on a state only by its consent and a state could
refuse to accept a norm for itself.2 The norms that fell within this
category embodied national interests and could be abrogated by
17. See Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. No. E/1990/94 (1990)
(Proposed Draft); U.N. Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, UNCTC Current
Studies ST/CTC/SER. A4 (1988) [hereinafter UNCTC].
18. The terms "law of nations" and Customary International Law (CIL) are used
interchangeably. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992)
(asserting that CIL is a direct descendant ofthe law ofnations); Sanchez-Espinozav. Reagan,
770 F.2d 202,206 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3,7 (D.D.C.
1998) ("The law of nations [is] currently known as international customary law.. .
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66.
20. See 1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 2, at 4 (1922).
21. By the nineteenth century, the view that states alone were the subjects of
international law was firmly entrenched in doctrine and practice. See LAUTERPACET, supra
note 2, at 6-7; Korowicz, supra note 2, at 533,535,541. As noted in Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7):
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules
of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement
of common aims.
22. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 27.
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treaty.' International law, however, also recognizedjus cogens-
another class of norms that binds all nations and cannot be
preempted by treaty.2'
Jus Cogens Norms Defined
A jus cogens norm is "a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted."' The origins ofjus cogens are unclear,
but since World War II it has developed as an exception to the
classicist principle of state consent in determining international
law.26 Its unconventional entry into the law has givenjus cogens the
status of customary law.27
Jus cogens norms, however, are distinguished from other
customary norms on the grounds that they satisfy not merely the
needs of individual states, but the "higher interest of the whole
international community."28 These are norms that are "ordered to
a transcendent common good of the international community."29
Determining jus cogens requires a two-step approach: first, the
establishment of a proposition as a "rule" of general international
law, and second, the acceptance of that rule as a "peremptory" norm
by the international community as a whole"'° This concept
essentially recognizes certain norms under international law that
cannot be modified by consent or treaty."1 Whatever its origins, the
concept of jus cogens is now accepted and allows norms without
23. See David F. Klein,A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law
of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INVL L. 332, 351 (1988).
24. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 38; Klein, supra note 23, at 350-51.
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,1969, art. 53,1155 U.N.T.S. 332,
344; RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supra note 3, § 102 cmt. k & reporters note 6 (incorporating the
Vienna Convention's definition ofjus cogens norms).
26. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 38.
27. See id.; MAicOLM N. SHAw, INTERNAwioNAL LAw 97 (4th ed. 1997).
28. Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositiuum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J.
INT' L. 55, 58 (1966).
29. Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Couenants on Human
Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 249 (1985).
30. See SHAW, supra note 27, at 97.
31. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 38; Klein, supra note 23, at 350-51.
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unanimous state consent to attain the status of international law
and bind all states.32
The norms, although easy to define, are more difficult to
identify.3 Violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy formed the initialjus cogens violations.'
In essence, "certain acts specified as universally reprehensible
[made] the perpetrator liable to capture and trial wherever he
went." 5 The violators ofjus cogens are classified as hostis humani
generis-enemies of all mankind. 6 The common denominators
underlying this classification were "the magnitude of the threat
posed by the acts coupled with the universality of condemnation."37
The universal condemnation standard suggests that the forum
in which the violator is tried represents all humanity. As a
consequence, ajus cogens violator may be tried in any forum.38 This
32. See Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, AM. Soc'Y INTL L. NEWSL, Jan. 1994,
at 1 ("We have developed the concept ofjus cogens... binding on all states regardless of a
particular state's consent... a form of tacit communal law-making... by general (not
unanimous) consent.").
33. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 516-17(5th ed. 1998)
( ore authority exists for the category ofjus cogens than exists for its particular content
and rules do not develop into customary law which readily correspond to new categories.");
Brudner, supra note 29, at 250; Klein, supra note 23, at 355.
34. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *68.
35. Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Torts Claim Act After Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 22 HARe.
INTL L.J. 53, 60 (1981). But cf I1T v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)
(refusing to make "the Eighth Commandment Thou Shalt not Stea' into the law of nations"
even if every nation's municipal law prohibits theft).
36. The doctrine was primarily applied to pirates because piracies usually occurred
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any sovereign and posed a "heinous threat" to common
safety. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 35, at 60; see also Filartigav. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations ... is the
right to be free of physical torture .... ITihe torturer has become like the pirate and slave
trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.").
37. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 35, at 61.
38. This concept is known as universal jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 3, § 404; see also Robert J. Peterson, Comment, Political Realism and the Judicial
Imposition of International Secondary Sanctions: Possibilities from John Doe v. Unocal and
theAlien Tort ClaimsAct, 5 U. CHI. L. CH. ROUNDTABLE 277,283 (1998). Although universal
jurisdiction has been exercised only in the context of criminal law, it is by no means limited
to criminal law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 404 cmt. b.
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original list has grown to include genocide, slave trade, and torture
among the violations of nonderogable norms.39
Although important, jus cogens norms are merely a narrow
subset of norms that fall within the law of nations.1' A norm of
customary international law (CIL) rises to the level ofjus cogens if
the international community recognizes the norm as so
fundamental that it is nonderogable. 1 Other violations, though
within the scope of CIL, do not reach the level of jus cogens
violations.42
Distinguishing Customary International Law
Although related, jus cogens and CIL differ in one important
respect.' Unlike the somewhat fixedjus cogens categories,44 CIL is
more evolutionary in scope.45 Customary international norms are
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 702. But see SHAW, supra note 27, at 97
(claiming that no clear agreement manifested regarding the norms beyond the established
categories of genocide, slave trading, and piracy).
40. See Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929,940 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 514-17 (discussing the notion
ofjus cogens as an overriding principle of international law); cf SHAW, supra note 27, at 544
(distinguishing between international crimes, which result from the breach of "essential"
international obligations, and international delicts, which comprise all other internationally
wrongful acts).
41. See Reagan, 859 F.2d at 940; BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 516.
42. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); ef
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 404 (identifying a more limited category of violations
ofuniversal concern" for which private actors may be held liable). But see Kadic v. Karadii6,
70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating the evolutionary nature of international law);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).
43. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,715 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Jus cogens
and customary international law ... differ in one important respect .... [Clustomary
international law rests on the consent of states.*).
44. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *68 (listing the three principal offenses). But
cf BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 516-17 (arguing that the contents ofjus cogens are at issue);
SHAW, supra note 27, at 665 (same).
45. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (explaining that international law should be
interpreted "as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 102(2) (defining CIL as the law resulting from the
"general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation");
SHAW, supra note 27, at 97.
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not permanently affixed and evolve to include new norms as they
gain universal acceptance."
Contemporary internationallaw is therefore best characterized
as having an established core, the classical system which
incorporates a predominantly statist view of international law,
and a modern expansion at the periphery, corresponding to
developments, largely in the human rights and environmental
protection areas, which do not fit within the classical
paradigm.47
In the post-World War II era, the proliferation of human rights
agreements expanded the scope of CIL to include international
human rights." Section 702 of the Restatement (Third) categorizes
the human rights abuses that constitute violations of CIL.49 Human
rights abuses not currently listed may be included in the future if
they achieve the status of customary law."0
46. The "universal acceptance" standard is interpreted rigidly in defining the core CIL
norms, which includes only "behavior which can be defined with enough clarity to be
judicially manageable." Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 35, at 93. This leaves open the
possibility that courts will sanction morally reprehensible acts through an expansion of the
definition of core norms even though such acts are not universally abhorred. See id. at 97.
This should concern us, because if a court follows Unocal and stretches the definitional
boundaries ofjus cogens, this expansive interpretation could result in the court imposing its
own morality without regard for the "universality" of the norm. This is not what customary
international law is designed to do and undermines the status ofjus cogens as "universally"
applicable norms.
47. Id. at 64.
48. See Curtis A. Bradley& Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law:A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 831-32 (1997); see
generally HENKmN, supra note 1, at 173 (stating that the CIL of human rights "found strong
articulation only when war came and later, after the Allies were victorious"). But see Jordan
J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources, and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA.
J. ITL & COMP. L. 147, 158-59 (1995/96) (stating that it is a "myth that'human rights law
did not begin until after the atrocities of World War II). As is true with regard to CIL
generally, customary human rights law is not derived from any single source. See Paust,
supra, at 147. Nor is there a "single set of participants," or any "arenas or institutional
arrangements for the creation, invocation, application, change or termination of [customary
human rights] law." Id. "Despite its relatively amorphous nature, CIL has essentially the
same binding force under international law as treaty law." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at
818.
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 702. The list of human rights violations
includes genocide, slavery, torture, and other cruel and degrading punishment. See id
50. See id. § 702 cmt. a.
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This flexibility in the scope of CIL, although desirable, also
creates the potential for abuse because courts can, and sometimes
do, confuse the two categories and stretch the bounds ofjus cogens
to include norms that fall within a moral "gray area."'" Even when
the universal applicability of these norms is unclear, the courts
often characterize morally reprehensible acts asjus cogens norms.52
Although courts claim that ATCA jurisdiction extends only to jus
cogens violations, they have interpreted the scope of jus cogens
fairly broadly on occasion.5"
Courts' growing tendency to expand the scope ofjus cogens has
at times stretched the imagination. The most liberal view of private
liability for a violation of the law of nations was taken by the
Maryland district court inAdra v. Clift."4 The Adra court held that
passport fraud constituted a violation of CIL.55 Although
undoubtedly a criminal act, fraud of this nature is by no means in
the same category as piracy or slavery. Even though a violation may
offend one's sense of natural justice, this does not necessarily
elevate it to the level of a universally condemned act.56
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS
Interpreting the Scope of Customary International Law
The problem with the "evolving" nature of CIL is that the
question of determining international norms is left open to the
inconsistent views of scholars and courts.57 In the past, the courts
51. See, e.g., National Coalition Gov't of Burma v. Unocal Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal.
1997); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). But cf Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp.
276 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that violation of the First Amendment does not rise to the level
of a universally recognized right and thus does not constitute law ofnations' as required by
ATCA).
52. See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 865.
53. See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 349;Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 865.
54. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
55. See Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 865.
56. The interpretive flexibility reflected by Filartiga and its progeny could be
characteristic of the "evolutionary" nature of CIL, but this does not necessarily transform
reprehensible acts into jus cogens violations.
57. See Louis B. Sohn, Sources of lternational Law, 25 GA. J. INVL & CoMP. L. 399,401
(1995/96) (MIlnternational law is made, not by states, but by 'silly' professors writing books
.... [Alt most,... international law is made by the legal advisers of Foreign Offices...
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have relied on a plethora of sources to determine international law,
including scholarly writings, other judicial decisions, and the
general usage and practice of nations."8 The reliance on such
sources to define international "law" should be analyzed carefully.
Allowing an expansive interpretation of the "rational ideal of the
good per se"59 creates the potential for domestic courts to impose
their own morality under the guise of fundamental international
norms. The adoption of an expansive interpretation of inter-
national law raises the specter of some courts subverting this
transcendent good to impose their own morality.
There is no universal agreement as to the precise extent of
human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all under
CIL.'0 As a result, in the absence of any ratification by states,
courts run the risk of unilaterally imposing their own view of a
"universally accepted norm" on foreign states and individuals,
especially in the context of human rights abuses.6" As mandated by
the court in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,62 a rule must command the
"general assent of civilized nations" before it becomes binding as
international law.63 In the absence of such a requirement, "the
courts of one nation might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal
rules upon others, in the name of applying international law.""
Though international law must be interpreted as it evolves, this
interpretation must conform to current international norms
evidenced by something more than the writings of scholars. Jus
dependingvery much on learned authors, not on a search of archives."). Similarly, the courts
rely on academia: "[The courts do] not do the original research. They read the books, and cite
the books .... " Id.
58. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
59. Klein, supra note 23, at 351.
60. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882. The dispute over the scope of "international law" was
painfully obvious during the negotiations over the U.N. Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations. See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text. The negotiations revealed that
universal norms, which were obvious to the developed world, were not as obvious to some of
the developing and socialist countries. See UNCTC, supra note 17.
61. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 35, at 90 ("Many cherished Western values of civil
liberties and political participation, although desirable as ideals, cannot become core norms
because their contravention is not universally culpable. Core norms must be supported by
general agreement that at least in principle their violation is wrong.").
62. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
63. Id. at 881.
64. Id
628 [Vol. 42:619
2000] REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
cogens should not be interpreted expansively to sanction conduct
that might be morally reprehensible but fails to find international
consensus.65
The ATCA in Federal Courts-A Split Over Who May be Liable
The ATCAhas been the primarytool for non-U.S. citizens to raise
human rights violations in U.S. courts.66 It grants district courts
original jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens for torts committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.67
The law of nations, as used in the ATCA, is understood to refer to
CIL.68 The scope of international law aside, the definition of the
category of actors liable under the ATCA also poses a problem.
The ATCA was a little-used provision until its resurrection in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. In Filartiga, the court found that "an act of
torture committed by a state official against one held in detention
violates established norms of the international law of human rights,
and hence the law of nations."69 Even though the court did not
impose state action as a requirement for ATCA jurisdiction, its
reference to a violation by a "state official" created the dubious
requirement of state action in suits involving CIL violations.70 This
state action requirement for ATCA jurisdiction has been disputed
in several cases since Filartiga.
65. See id. at 888 ("It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international
accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violationwithin the
meaning of the [ATCAI." (emphasis added)); Klein, supra note 23, at 355 ("[C]ourts should
be careful to construe Uus cogens] narrowly.").
66. See William Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in U.S. Courts: The Karadzic
Litigation and the Yugoslav Conflict, 14 BERKELEYJ. INTVLL. 137, 138-39 (1996).
67. The analysis of violation of treaty obligations is beyond the scope of this Note.
68. See ArthurM. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21
VAND. J.TRANSNAT'LL. 1, 3 (1988). But see Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 ("The requirement that
a rule command the 'general assent of civilized nations' to become binding upon them all is
a stringent one.").
69. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
70. See Ariadne K Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They be Held
Liable Under the Alien Torts Claim Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROO. J. INl L.
927, 940 (1997/98).
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Subsequent decisions interpreted Filartiga to require state action
before liability could attach.7 In spite of the ATCA's silence on the
subject, some courts read it to include a requirement for state
action, at least where certain international torts were concerned.
Several courts, however, adopted a more liberal policy and de-
termined that state action was not necessary to invoke ATCA
jurisdiction."2
These contradictory holdings have resulted in a split among the
circuits. Some circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have limited
liability under international human rights law to individuals
acting under official authority or color of authority.73 Others,
including the Second Circuit, have extended liability to purely
private actions.74
Absent an explicit mandate, the requirement of state action acts
as a check on the ability of courts to sanction private conduct
under the guise of sanctioning nonderogable international norms.
75
71. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Tel-Oren
involved a suit against the Palestine Liberation Organization for international terrorist
activities in violation of the law of nations. See id. Decided afterFilartiga, Tel-Oren held that
the law of nations does not impose the same liability on nonstate actors as it does on
individuals acting under color of law. &e id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring). Unlike
Filartiga, where the defendant was a state official, the defendant actors in Tel-Oren were
nonstate actors, and therefore were not liable for international human rights violations. See
id.; see also Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985) as authority for the
proposition that the law of nations does not apply to private nonstate conduct).
72. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadiid, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876;
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
73. See, e.g., Hamid, 51 F.3d at 1417-18; see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 978
F.2d 493, 501 (9th Cir. 1992); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-95; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell, Foreign
Environmental and Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 145, 164 (1999).
74. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880; Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 865.
Specifically, Kadic found that certain conduct such as genocide violates the law of nations
whether committed by a state or a private actor. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
75. Cf 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 165 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th
ed. 1948) (explaining that, although a state is vicariously responsible for official acts of
administrative officials and the military, a state's vicarious responsibility for acts of private
persons is limited to exercising due diligence to prevent internationally injurious acts on the
part of private persons); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act
of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 476 (1989) (stating that ijin a limited
number of instances... the smooth functioning of the international system required the
explicit protection or proscription of individual activity," yet the bulk of international law
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Further, this requirement is also in accord with the original under-
standing of the scope of international law and the actors who may
be held liable for violations of such law. 6 Even the courts that
have adopted a more liberal approach to the requirement of state
action caution that liability attaches only when the crimes are of
"universal concern."
77
While there is a broad range of conduct that violates the law of
nations, these violations are actionable only if committed by a state
actor." "To allege state action, the challenged conduct must be
attributable to the state... it must be official conduct."79 State
action also comes into play when an individual acts under official
authority or under "color of law."0
Regardless of the position of different courts with regard to
private liability, they usually have found that state action was
involved. The courts in Unocal and Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., '
two of the stronger assertions of private liability under
international law, sidestepped the issue by concluding that
although private liability could attach, they did not need to decide
the issue because the facts before them showed that the defendants
"regulated the conduct of states as monolithic entities in their relations with other states").
76. Originally, CIL referred to the general practice of states and could only be applied in
the context of state action. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
77. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888; National Coalition Gov't of
Burma v. Unocal Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also RESTATEMEN (THIRD),
supra note 3, § 404.
78. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supra note 3, § 702 (listing genocide, slavery, and torture
among the several acts by a state that constitute a violation of international law if practiced
or encouraged as a matter ofstate policy). Genocide is the only violation that falls outside the
state action requirement. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239; Beanalv. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969
F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. La. 1997) (holding that state action is necessary for nongenocide-
related human rights violations).
79. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 207 cmt.
c). In Beanal, the court found that the requirement of state action was not met because the
plaintiff failed to allege the state and its military personnel's role in the human rights
violations committed by Freeport-McMoran, the corporate entity. See id. at 374. In spite of
the affiliation between the government and the corporation, the court found that the
corporation had neither acted under color of state authority, nor aided and abetted state
action. See id. at 374-75. According to the court, the state action requirement could not be
met by merely acting in concert with a foreign state. See i&L at 375.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 207 cmt. c.
81. 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
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were acting under "color of law."8 2 Although it is true that these
cases involved some level of state action,83 it is curious that the
courts scramble to the safety net of state action in applying the
ATCA to the cases before them. Especially in Unocal, where the
corporations were only passively involved in human rights
violations, the court stretches acceptable bounds by fitting
corporate inaction under "color of authority." "4 The validity of their
assertions seems questionable when these courts only address the
issue of whether state action is mandatory in dicta.
UNOCAL'S IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE ACTORS
Unlike earlier cases, Unocal stretches the notion of private
liability under international law beyond the bounds of precedent.
The plaintiffs in Unocal, farmers in the Tennesarim region of
Burma, brought a lawsuit against Unocal corporation. 5 The
corporation was engaged in a joint venture to construct a gas
pipeline in the region." The plaintiffs sought to hold Unocal and its
82. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445 ("No logical reason exists for allowing ...
corporations to escape liability... merely because they were not acting under color of law.
... However, this Court need not make that determination [because plaintiff] has pled
sufficient facts to allege that [d]efendants acted as agents of the state."); Unocal, 176 F.R.D.
329, 348-49 ("Even in the absence of state action, Unocal could conceivably be liable for
certain violations of international law .... The Court need not resolve this issue...
however, because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction... based on plaintiffs' state
action theory.").
83. In Unocal, the Burmese military junta was actively involved in human rights
violations during the construction of a gas pipeline. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text. In Iwanowa, Ford Motor Company was alleged to have conducted its operations in
Germany during World War II under the protection of the Nazis. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp.
2d at 432-33. Given their collaboration with the military regimes, corporations such as the
ones in Unocal and Iwanowa are actors under "color of law."
84. "A private individual acts under color of law.., when he acts together with state
officials or with significant state aid." Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. Unocal became a co-actor in the
Burmese junta's perpetration of human rights abuses because the corporation "knowingly
accepted" the benefits of forced labor. See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 349.
85. See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 336.
86. See id. at 335-36. According to Unocal, however, the entity constructing the pipeline
was a corporation, not a joint venture. A Unocal subsidiary was a minority shareholder
(28.26%), with the remaining shares held by a Total affiliate, a Burmese company owned and
operated by the Burmese junta, and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand. See Statement of
Unocal for Dep't of Lab. Rep't to Cong., (Feb. 1998) (on file with William and Mary Law
Review). This dispute is significant in light of the hierarchy of corporate liability based on
the level of involvement in perpetrating human rights abuses. See infra note 101 and
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French associate, Total S.A., liable as implied partners of the
Burmese military government 7 in perpetrating human rights
violations. 8 These violations included forced labor, torture, and
illegal detentions by the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) in the course of constructing the gas pipeline.89 The
plaintiffs alleged that these abuses violated the law of nations.9 "
Although "state action" was implicated in this case, the court found
that even absent state action, a private corporate entity could be
held liable for a CIL violation.9" The court claimed that private
liability in the absence of state action is not inconsistent with the
ATCA 92
While this proposition reflects the growing trend of holding
private individuals liable, Unocal is the first case that realizes fears
of potential misuse of the ATCA. The court analogized the use of
forced labor in constructing the pipeline to slave trading.93 While
conceding that private liability should be confined to jus cogens
violations,"' the court simultaneously stretched the definition of a
jus cogens violation-slave trade-to make the conduct at
issue-forced labor-fit the definition.95 Forced labor involves
involuntary and abusive conduct, however, unlike slavery, it does
not involve ownership rights in other human beings. This is not to
say that forced labor should be condoned under any standard, but
if allowed, this definitional flexibility might lead U.S. courts to
accompanying text.
87. The Burmese junta is better known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC). See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 334.
88. See id. at 336.
89. See id. Unocal, however, denied the allegations and claimed that the alleged abuses
occurred on unrelated government projects in the same region. See Statement of Unocal
Corp. for Dep't of Lab. Rep't to Cong., supra note 86.
90. See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 348 ("Even in the absence of state action, Unocal could
conceivably be liable for certain violations of international law...
91. See id. at 348-49.
92. See id.
93. See id, The Court rejected Unocal's argument that the military junta's requirement
that its citizens provide labor for government projects was akin to civil service. See id. Even
though the government was not physically selling its citizens to Unocal, the allegation that
Unocal "knowingly accepted" the benefits of forced labor could be "sufficient to state a claim
for participation in slave trading." Id.
94. See id at 345 ("Jurisdiction under the ATCA may be premised on alleged violations
of ajus cogens, or [a] peremptory ... norm.").
95. See id. at 349.
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sanction deviant conduct that does not rise to the level of a jus
cogens violation.
Unocal's Impact on U.S. Multinational Corporations
Even if corporate conduct does not violate ajus cogens norm, U.S.
courts may still sanction U.S. corporations. 6 As stated in Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic,97 however, "ventur[ing] out of the
comfortable realm of established international law... in which
states are the actors ... requires an assessment of the extent to
which international law imposes not only rights but also obligations
on individuals." 8 Under the standard of international law, the
scope of a private entity's obligations is unclear. Given the
continually evolving standard of international norms, and the
resulting flexibility in interpreting these norms, it is likely that
corporate obligations could be determined ex post facto.99
These are valid concerns, especially where less egregious human
rights violations are concerned. Under the murky CIL standard, if
other courts follow Unocal's dicta, they would discourage corporate
activity, especially in regions with questionable human rights
96. In so far as MNCs are the nationals of the states in which their headquarters are
located, federal courts have jurisdiction over U.S.-based MNCs. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 3, § 402; Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and theAlien Tort ClaimsAct,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1535-36 (1998) (book review); see also Brian Johnsd, Chevron Sued Over
Nigerian Violence, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1999, at 11 ("We give these corporations lots of
rights in America... this case is about what responsibilities they have ... [sic] too."
(quoting Cindy Cohn, an attorney for the victims of Chevron sponsored governmentalhuman
rights abuses in Nigeria)); cf Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 153, 168-69 (1997) (discussing Congress' regulation of U.S. corporations in
the international trade arena).
97. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
98. Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
99. Cf David I. Becker, Note, A Call for the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32
CORNELLINT'LL.J. 183, 206 (1999) (quoting an attorney's warning that the Unocal doctrine
merely warns companies very generally that they should not knowingly benefit from a
governmental business partner's human rights violations). The degree of knowledge, the
amount of benefit received, and the types of abuses for which a corporation may be held
liable are not clarified. Under the Unocal approach, these questions might be answered only
after the corporation has to account for its actions before a court. This after the fact
determination prevents corporations from ensuring compliance with a predetermined
standard of responsibility.
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records.10 0 Given the uncertainty regarding the level of corporate
action or inaction that constitutes a violation,'' Unocal would
discourage collaborations in regions with bad human rights records
because any level of collaboration could make a corporation guilty
by association even if it does not actively commit any crimes. 10 2 In
host countries where the government is the only significant
economic entity that can join a corporate venture, the Unocal
approach discourages corporate activity and has the practical effect
of a direct economic sanction. 03
The courts' regulation of corporations that operate in developing
and underdeveloped countries, also regulates the host nations-the
countries in which the MNCs conduct their activities. Sanctions
against the corporations for human rights abuses also serve as
economic sanctions against the host countries which usually affirm,
or at the very least, do not object to the business practices of the
MNCs as long as they generate economic development. In a clash
100. See, e.g., Petroleum Times Energy Report, Confusion over India-Myanmar Gas
Sourcing Project, July 24, 1998, at 6, available at http'//www.web7.infotrac.galegroup.com
("Shell is being ultra-cautious about getting involved with any government that has a bad
human rights record, such as that of Myanmar.").
101. See generally Cassel, supra note 7, at 1981; Frey, supra note 96, at 180. Under the
current regime of international law, corporate responsibility falls into a continuum of legal
and moral responsibility that can be divided into four broad categories. First, a corporation
has the greatest responsibility to act when it is a direct participant in human rights abuses.
See Frey, supra note 96, at 181-82. Next, the corporation has some affirmative responsibility
to intervene if it derives some benefit from the abuses, even though it does not directly
perpetrate them. See id. at 183-84. At the third level of responsibility, if the corporation's
influential economic stature allows it to exert an influence, an affirmative duty to prevent
abuse is recommended, but not mandated. See id. at 184-86. The last situation involves a
corporation that, although aware of human rights abuses, is neither directly nor indirectly
involved in the abusive practices, and these abuses are unrelated to the corporation's
activities. In such a scenario, the corporation has no responsibility to prevent the abuses. See
id. at 186-87. If interpreted liberally, Unocal could alter these guidelines for corporate
responsibility with respect to human rights abuses.
102. See William J. Aceves, International Decisions: Doe v. Unocal, 92 AM. J. INTLL. 309,
314 (1998) ("The consequences of this decision should be far-reaching.... Private companies
subject to suit in the United States may be more cautious about entering into agreements
with foreign governments that have a poor human rights record."). This was evidenced by
Shell's reluctance to be involved in projects in Burma. See supra note 100.
103. See Aceves, supra note 102, at 314 ("To encourage investment, foreign governments
must be willing to protect human rights within their own countries."); cf Peterson, supra
note 38, at 296 ("Judicially created secondary sanctions in the form of a finding ofjoint tort
liability against a foreign company.., would create the same effect in some cases as
congressionally created secondary sanctions.").
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between economic growth and human rights, economic development
usually trumps in these countries.'" Judicial sanctions against
corporations indirectly regulate the conduct of errant governments
by regulating foreign investments.
The fact that the courts are regulating corporations, specifically
U.S.-based MNCs, gives this whole endeavor an aura of legitimacy.
After all, the courts do have the authority to sanction errant
domestic corporations. °5 Further, this is an effective way of
enforcing human rights especially in countries where foreign
investment is crucial. Nonetheless, these beneficial side effects do
not justify the use of the legal system to impose indirect
sanctions.0 6 That is a role that properly belongs to the political
branches, not the courts.'0 7 This distinction is especially significant
in light of the fact that current U.S. policy favors investment by
private companies even in countries with the poorest human rights
records, with the exception of Libya and some other "rogue"
states.0 8 U.S. investment is encouraged because "U.S. business can
and does play a positive and important role promoting the openness
of societies, respect for individual rights, the promotion of free
104. See generally Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Right to Development as a Human Right:
Results of the Global Consultation, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 322 (1991); John O'Manique, Human
Rights and Development, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 78 (1992). The position of these countries is
summarized in the "economics first" argument, which asserts that the inalienable right to
development must be guaranteed first. But see Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in
ASEAN Countries: "Promises to Keep and Miles to Go before I Sleep," 2 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEv. L.J. 1, 22 (1999) (criticizing the "economics first" argument for allowing civil and
political rights to be suppressed indefinitely because the threshold of sufficient economic
development is not defined and governments cannot be compelled to declare when this
threshold has been reached).
105. The jurisdiction of federal courts to sanction "law of nations" violations is derived
from the ATCA. See ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
106. But cf Peterson, supra note 38, at 296 (discussing the beneficial implications of
judicially imposed secondary sanctions).
107. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 860-70 (emphasizing that the
separation of powers forecloses the courts' interference with the President's legislative
duties); Arthur ML Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV.
1205, 1251-56 (1988); see also Donald J. Kochan, Note, Constitutional Structure as a
Limitation on the Scope of the "Law of Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 153, 182 (1998) ("Because international law is so closely tied to... the political
questions of international relations, judicial decisions entrenching principles into binding
restrictions on sovereignty necessarily constrain the latitude of the political branches.").
108. See Frey, supra note 96, at 186.
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markets and prosperity, environmental protection and the setting
of high standards for business practices generally."" 9
This is not to suggest that U.S. courts should not regulate the
conduct of U.S. corporations. Although the murky standard of
"international law" poses a problem, the right of U.S. courts to
regulate does not, at least as far as MNCs headquartered in the
United States are concerned.11 ° In return for the rights and
privileges guaranteed to the corporations, the courts may certainly
impose obligations on them. A definition of the extent of corporate
responsibility, however, is necessary before corporations are sanc-
tioned. It is not enough to state that their conduct should be
assessed against the backdrop of CIL, because that is a vague and
evolving standard, which defines neither the bounds of acceptable
action nor inaction.
Although the broader question of whether indirect sanctions are
justified remains unanswered, a clarification of the scope of
corporate responsibility would at least serve to notify corporations
of the bounds of acceptable conduct, especially when they are
involved in countries with shaky human rights records."' To the
extent that this standard for liability would be a uniform standard,
blindly imposed by the courts, it wouldvalidatejudicial interference
in international policy to a certain extent.
Implications of Unocal for Foreign Corporations
Accountability under international law also poses serious
problems when alien corporations are thrown into the mix.
109. 1 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MODEL BUSINESS PRINCIPLES 2 (1996)). For
example, Unocal claims that in the course of constructing the pipeline, it not only paid fair
wages, but also initiated health care and education programs in the region. See Trouble in
The Pipeline, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1997, at 39.
110. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
111. In Unocal, for instance, the plaintiffs alleged that Unocal "knew or should have
known" of the forced labor practices of SLORC. National Coalition Gov't of Burmav. Unocal,
176 F.R.D. 329, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1997). Given the egregious nature of the human rights
violations, the"knew or should have known" standard might be justified in this one instance,
but the court failed to establish a bright line rule for corporations seeking to avoid liability.
See Joseph D. Pizzurro & Nancy E. Delaney, New Peril for Companies Doing Business
Overseas:Alien Tort ClaimsAct InterpretedBroadly, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 24,1997, atS5; Gregory
J. Wallace, Fallout From Slave-Labor Case is Troubling, 150 N.J. L.J. 896, Dec. 8, 1997, at
24, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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Although curbing human rights abuses is a desirable goal, the shift
in emphasis from state to private actors raises another disturbing
issue: can U.S.;courts, using a broad definition ofjus cogens, now
use the ATCA to impose their own standard of acceptable human
rights norms on alien corporations? 112 Under the current rules of
interpretation,, once a U.S court deems a violation to be of
"universal concern," the lack of such concern on the part of any one
state is inconsequential. The violator, deemed an "enemy of all
mankind," may be liable wherever he goes, or in the case of
corporations, wherever an alien plaintiff chooses to sue the
corporate actor.113, If the concept of universal jurisdiction. 4 is
applied in the corporate context, alien corporations could find
themselves dragged into U.S. courts for their overseas violations. To
use the Unocal example, if the court's characterization of private
liability had been taken a step further, Total S.A., Unocal's French
partner in the joint venture, could have been liable for human
rights violations.11
Under these circumstances, the lack of French diplomatic or
judicial consensus with the Unocal court's characterization of forced
labor, or France's failure to sanction Total S.A. and restrict similar
activities of other corporations, would be irrelevant in determining
whether a violation of international law had occurred.116 This result
is somewhat counterintuitive because the natural, although
somewhat naYve, assumption would be that an international norm
112. ATCA-based tort attacks on alien corporations could be perceived by some countries
as an attack on their sovereignty. This is especially true in those countries where the larger
corporations represent broad national interests. See Peterson, supra note 38, at 287.
113. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
115. Total S.A. was subsequently dismissed from the litigation for lack ofjurisdiction. See
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Although this dismissal
temporarily allays fears that U.S. courts will now indiscriminately sanction alien
corporations for their human rights abuses, the liberal approach of Filartiga and its
progeny-cases that have found non-U.S. individuals liable-suggests that itis only a matter
of time before non-U.S. corporations are also held accountable. Once alien corporations
violate the "law of nations" their nationality will have no effect on the ability of U.S. courts
to impose sanctions on these corporations.
116. Interestingly, there is no record of Total S.A. being sanctioned in France or in Europe
for its alleged human rights violations in Burma. See Court of Justice, Recent Case Law, at
http:/curia.eu.inttsv/jurisphindex.htm(lastvisited Oct. 10, 2000);cf Peterson, supra note 38,
at 287 (indicating France, among other nations, has been most willing to deal with "rogue"
nations in the past).
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is determined through international consensus. In reality, however,
universal consensus plays no role in determining international'
norms."7 On the one hand, the developed world adopts a flexible,
overinclusive approach in defining the scope of international law.
On the other, the developing world prefers "international
obligations" to international law and does not like the other camp's
overinclusive approach." 8
A federal court cannot steamroll over these delicate concerns
while applying international norms to corporate activity, especially
the activities of alien corporations. Of course, several procedural
safeguards are available to make these concerns seem inflated.119
With increasing global integration, however, the safety net of
personal jurisdiction and other procedural safeguards may
disappear, leaving alien corporations at the mercy of U.S. courts. 20
117. For instance, manybelieve that change in Burma should be generated through gentle
persuasion and the "wielding of'economic carrots." Thio, supra note 104, at 45. Singapore
and other ASEAN countries maintain that promoting Burma's economic development and
integration into the world economywill eventually lead to political liberalization. As a result,
these countries actively promote bilateral economic cooperation. See id. The Unocal court,
proceeding on the assumption that the alleged forced labor practices constituted ajus cogens
violation, failed to account for alternative views, such as ASEAN's, as the court's only
concern appeared to be domestic, not international, consensus. See National Coalition Gov't
of Burma v. Unocal Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 353 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (reiterating the need for
international consensus, yet failing to discuss whether SLORC's forced labor practices had
been condemned internationally). This concern with domestic consensus was reinforced when
the court sought the opinion of the Department of State regarding the foreign policy
implications of the litigation and the impact of this case on U.S. relations with Burma. See
id. at 362.
118. See UNCTC, supra note 17; see also Thio, supra note 104, at 15 (stating that
proponents of"Asian values" argue that human rights norms embody"alien values"). Under
Unocal, however, as long as ajudicialdecision does notdirectlycontradictU.S. foreign policy,
the court need not consider any transnational policies and concerns. See Unocal, 176 F.R.D.
at 354 (stating that sanctions against SLORC would be justified in light of the "limited
implications" for U.S. foreign relations with Burma).
119. See generally Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 73 (discussing the substantial
hurdles that alien plaintiffs bringing ATCA claims face in federal courts); see also Becker,
supra note 99, at 199-200 (discussing the restrictions on an alien plaintiffs choice of forum
and causes of action under the ATCA);
120. The concern that procedural safeguards might become insignificant over time is not
an imaginary one. In one instance, the Texas Supreme Court forcefully stated that "[tihe
doctrine of forum non conveniens is obsolete in a world in which markets are globaL... The
parochial perspective embodied in the doctrine of forum non conveniens enables corporations
to evade legal control merely because they are transnational." Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro
Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 688-89 (Tex. 1990). As a result, the court rejected Dow's motion to
dismiss based on forum non conveniens and allowed Costa Rican plantation workers to
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This increased vulnerability of alien corporations to U.S. courts,
however unlikely, would be a strong disincentive for collaboration
between U.S. and alien corporations in other countries, again
causing a reduction in economic growth. 2'
Proposal to Mandate Corporate Conduct
Without a doubt, some violations committed by corporations
-domestic and alien-are abhorrent and deserve to be addressed,
but the Unocal approach is not the answer. If Unocal indicates the
new direction, then the future of international law is merely as a
catchall used to regulate corporate conduct. Under a Unocal
approach, courts are not really applying international law and
following the general practice of a substantial number of nations.
Ironically, while the judiciary broadens its interpretation of
international law to regulate corporate conduct, the remaining
branches of government consistently have refused to implement any
mechanisms that effectively regulate corporate conduct in an
international context.'22 For instance, the U.N. Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations, established in the 1980s, faced strong
opposition from the United States.' The Code, if adopted, would
have imposed upon transnational corporations (TNCs) a duty to
respect human rights and the fundamental freedoms of their
employees in the countries in which the TNCs operate.' The Code,
however, was never formally adopted in spite of extensive
negotiations?'5
proceed against Dow for their injuries resulting from exposure to Doew's chemicals. See id.
The court in Alfaro found that it had personal jurisdiction over Dow, a U.S. corporation,
therefore its rejection of a procedural safeguard such as forum non conveniens might not
seem radical. The decision, however, raises questions about how courts will react to such
safeguards in the future, especially when non-U.S. players in the global markets raise them
as defenses.
121. The economic effects of extending private liability to alien corporations are beyond
the scope of this Note. This Note merely raises possible implications of applying Unocal to
alien corporations.
122. See Justin Lu, Note, Jurisdiction ouerNon.StateActivity under theAlien Tort Claims
Act, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531, 540 (1997).
123. See UNCTC, supra note 17.
124. See id,
125. In the Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
a spokesperson for the State Department admitted that U.S. policy (as determined by the
[Vol. 42:619640
2000] REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 641
Given the interplay between international law and foreign policy,
courts should hesitate before sanctioning corporate conduct under
international law without an express mandate from the remaining
branches."2 If the concern is the regulation of deviant corporate
conduct, one solution would be to codify Unocal and hold private
actors liable regardless of state action. ' 7 Such a codification would
not only enhance the remedies available to alien victims of human
rights abuses, but also the rights of corporations. 8 The problem
with such a codification is that it is only a local solution. 9 Under
the proposed framework, foreign plaintiffs complaining of a U.S.
corporation's extraterritorial abuses would be granted an oppor-
tunity for redress, but plaintiffs' ability to bring an action against
alien corporations in U.S. courts would still be subject to the
previously mentioned jurisdictional hurdles.130 Thus, the proposed
codification fails to address the larger concern of sanctioning the
human rights abuses of all MNCs regardless of nationality.
Department of Commerce, among others) was that the Code should not move forward.
Rather perversely, the State Department's goal was to defeat the adoption of the Code
despite a decade of negotiations conducted at the behest of the United States, which had
resulted in significant improvements to the Code. See U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy, Trade,
Oceans and Env't of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 12-25 (1990)
(statementofJane E. Becker, DeputyAssistantSecretary for International Development and
Technical Specialized Agency Affairs, Department of State). This policy in favor of giving
U.S. corporations free reign seems directly contradictory to the position adopted by the
courts, which seek to regulate the conduct of MNCs.
126. For a discussion of the relation between the judicial and political branches in the
context of sources and interpretation ofinternational law, see A. M. Weisburd, State Courts,
Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INTL L. 1, 38-44 (1995). Congress has
expressly and implicitly rejected some of the sources used by the courts to determine
international law as 'law." See Kochan, supra note 107, at 182; see also Wade Mansell &
Joanne Scott, Why Bother About a Right to Development?, 21 J.L. & Soc'Y 171, 171 (1994)
("The idea of international law... distinguishtesi itself from politics only with the greatest
difficulty [and] ... has a very different feel' from the taught orthodoxies of domestic law.").
127. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 99, at 183; Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and
Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 48 CATH. U.L. REV. 881 (1999).
128. See Kieserman, supra note 127, at 933 (recommending a legislative modification of
the ATCA).
129. But see Becker, supra note 99, at 207 ("[A codification of] the Unocal doctrine in
general... comports with the emerging perspective of a 'world society' where concern for
fundamental human rights transcends national borders.").
130. See sources cited supra note 119.
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An alternative solution would be to enact a mandatory code
of corporate conduct along the lines of the U.N. Code of Conduct
for Transnational Corporations.3 Although the U.N. Code was
voluntary,"3 2 it was a significant step toward regulating corporate
conduct with respect to human rights. The Code contained a
provision that imposed on MNCs a duty to respect the human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which they
operate.13 3 MNCs were also prohibited from discriminating on the
basis of race, color, national and ethnic origin, and were required to
conform to the host countries' policies designed to extend equality
of opportunity and treatment.1 '
While critics argue against a mandatory code of conduct based on
concerns about the lack of enforceability, the existence of such a
code would clarify at least the grounds for holding a corporation
liable, 3 5 and the threat of harsh judicial sanctions for failure to
comply may suffice to regulate corporate conduct. Some would
argue that in the absence of a regulatory body that ensures
compliance with such a code, enacting another code might serve
little purpose; such a code would be similar to the voluntary codes
of conduct already adopted by several corporations. While the
formidable task of enacting a mandatory code, especially in an
131. See Frey, supra note 96, at 170. Although a corporate code of conduct seems a
desirable method of regulating the conduct of corporations, especially in the field of human
rights, Congress in recent years has struck down several proposals for meaningful codes of
conduct. See id. at 170-71. The Clinton administration's "Model Business Principles," a
voluntary and unenforceable set of guidelines issued in May 1995, has been the resulting
compromise. See Cassel, supra note 7, at 1974.
132. In recent years, self-imposed codes ofconduct have also become increasingly popular.
Corporations that have implemented codes of conduct include: The Gap, Timberland, Wal-
Mart, and Levi Strauss, among others. See Cassel, supra note 7, at 1973.
133. See UNCTC, supra note 17, at 31.
134. See id.
135. The task of clarifying the scope of international law is a daunting one. For example,
one of the issues raised in the initial Code negotiations was the scope of international law.
At the time, the developing and socialist countries regarded the content of CIL as being
unrepresentative of their own practices. The only relevant international standards that these
countrieswere willing to concede included obligations derived from conventions, agreements,
treaties, and other instruments based on the express consent of the states. See UNCTC,
supra note 17, at 21. Ironically, the Code called for a flexible evolutionary approach, similar
to the approach adopted by the courts in Unocal and Iwanowa. This evolutionary approach,
however, was probably acceptable only because of the voluntary nature of the Code. If a
similar code is mandated, it seems the scope of international law will have to be better
clarified.
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international setting, might make judicial determination of the
scope of international law seem more attractive, the relative ease
of the judicial approach does not legitimize the interpretative
flexibility of the Unocal court. By clarifying the scope of inter-
national law, a mandatory code would restrain judicial expansion
of the categories of CIL violations to include less egregious
violations. Finally, such a code would also provide corporations with
guidelines for their operations by notifying them of the activities
that are subject to sanctions.3 6
CONCLUSION
International law is an evolving concept that must be interpreted
by the courts." 7 Although some scholars claim that interpreting the
"law of nations" is no different from deriving common law, 138 the
determination of international norms by federal courts raises
several concerns. U.S. courts certainly have the power to determine
whether U.S. citizens, including corporations, have committed
egregious human rights violations upon foreign nationals in their
own countries.Ih9 The regulation of private acts of corporations must
arise from a predetermined standard. Problems arise, however,
when liability for private actions attaches under the murky
standard of international law. Authorities supporting individual
liability gloss over the "evolving" nature of international human
136. The spectrum of corporate responsibility could be incorporated in a mandatory code
along with specific penalties for different levels of corporate action or inaction in the face of
human rights violations. This basic frameworkwould at least provide some bright line rules
for corporations seeking to modify their conduct to avoid liability for human rightsviolations.
137. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction....").
138. See Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 73, at 170 ("IT]here is no question that the
federal judiciary has the power to determine what is international law, and... what is
meant by the 'law of nations."); see also Klein, supra note 23, at 334 ("Courts applying
international law must interpret customary international law principles just as they
determine other common law rules, not by examining statutory materials, but by exploring
past practices and precedents."). But see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 852-53
(rejecting, post-Erie, the notion of customary international law as federal common law).
139. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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rights law; moral "gray" areas' 40 do not fall within the scope of
international law. The determination of new policies adopted by the
international community and the sources from which international
law is derived-the works of scholars, nonbinding international
agreements-raises the specter of sanctions imposed by federal
courts based on their notions of what constitutes international law.
Cloaking these decisions in legality under "international law" would
transform the federal courts into a tool for economic sanctions and
a regulator of foreign policy."
The Unocal approach also threatens the private acts of alien
corporations. Although some commentators discount the possibility
of judicial abuse because of the jurisdictional hurdles preventing
alien corporations from being dragged into U.S. courts, expanding
global integration and increasing joint ventures may diminish the
importance of these jurisdictional barriers. Applying international
law to alien corporations raises the same questions surrounding its
use against domestic corporations: should this flexible standard be
applied without explicit acceptance of the international norms it
incorporates?42 If international law is the standard being used, why
are other countries not imposing similar sanctions under the aegis
of international law?
If both the scope of international law and the liable parties are
unclear, U.S. courts run the risk of sanctioning aliens, including
corporations over which they have no jurisdiction under this
questionable international law standard. This is not to say that the
courts lack the power to sanction certain universally condemned
crimes, such as genocide. Other crimes that do not invoke universal
jurisdiction, however, should be examined more carefully. In
Unocal, the court stretched the scope. of slavery to include
conscripted labor and concluded that these abuses were universally
condemned under international law. Correcting human rights
140. Expropriation of property is one such moral "gray' area. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
413-15; Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1990); Guinto v.
Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
141. Anyjudicial sanctions that are imposed againstprivate individuals should be imposed
with this consideration in mind- is the litigation at hand an indirect attempt to regulate the
host country involved?
142. Even those who advocate the Unocal approach in sanctioning alien corporations
caution that liability should be imposed only for violations of strictjus cogens norms. See,
e.g., Peterson, supra note 38, at 299.
644 [Vol. 42:619
20001 REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
violations is a desirable goal in itself. Policing such violations in the
international context, however, is not within the judicial role of the
federal courts, absent a clear mandate on what constitutes inter-
national law and the responsible actors under international law.
MNCs with global interests face the very real threat of being held
accountable for human rights violations that do not amount tojus
cogens violations. At the same time, because of the unclear scope of
their obligations under international law, multinationals could also
be liable for their failure to act.1' The need for checks against the
abuse of this grant of discretion to the federal courts seems obvious.
Judicial assessment is more appropriate "the greater the degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of inter-
national law."5 44 Squeezing certain conduct within prescribed
norms, thus distorting the definition and expanding the scope of
international law, is unjustified without an express mandate, both
congressional and international. The increased judicial focus on
human rights violations overseas is a quantum step in the right
direction. Before actually regulating corporate conduct, we must
answer the unsettled question of what courts are attempting to
regulate. The obvious answer-international human rights
abuses-is obfuscated when we factor in the nationality of the
actors who may be liable.
If the concern is that private actors will not be held accountable,
then Unocal's dicta-private liability in the absence of state
action-should be codified. Although the codification of Unocal
might be a solution, it is only a short term, domestic solution. More
accurately, it will serve only to regulate the conduct of U.S.-
headquartered MNCs with overseas operations. Restricting the
activities of U.S. MNCs without imposing similar restraints on
alien corporations allows the latter greater access to developing
markets. The adverse impact on the competitiveness of U.S
143. At least one advocate of Unocal warns that in the future liability imposed on
corporations should be direct: "offending corporation[s] should have directly benefited from
the alleged violation, and not just participated as a silent partner."Id. at 299. Also, plaintiffs
alleging human rights abuses must be able to show that the corporation either knew or
should have known, or the offenses were so common that a reasonable person would expect
the offenses to occur. See id.
144. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)) (emphasis added).
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corporations is certainly an economic, even though not a legal,
concern.
If the concern, however, is that human rights violations by all
MNCs, regardless of their nationality, will go unregulated, then we
should adopt a legally binding code for MNC conduct. As the
problem is a corollary of increasing globalization, the solution
should be global as well. A mandatory code of conduct, although not
a perfect solution, is a positive step in the right direction. The
process of formulating such a code will not only bring all interested
parties-MNCs, developed, and developing countries-to the table,
but also will provide a forum in which to voice their concerns. It
will, hopefully, result in a more comprehensive answer to the
problem of human rights abuses and justify the time and effort
invested in such a solution.
Pia Zara Thadhani
